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COULD GOD LOVE CRUELTY?
A Partial Defense of Unrestricted Theological Voluntarism
Laura Frances Callahan

One of the foremost objections to theological voluntarism is the contingency
objection. If God’s will fixes moral facts, then what if God willed that agents
engage in cruelty? I argue that even unrestricted theological voluntarists
should accept some logical constraints on possible moral systems—hence,
some limits on ways that God could have willed morality to be—and these
logical constraints are sufficient to blunt the force of the contingency objection. One constraint I defend is a very weak accessibility requirement, related
to (but less problematic than) existence internalism in metaethics. The theological voluntarist can maintain: Godcouldn’t have loved cruelty, and even
though he could have willed behaviors we find abhorrent, he could only
have done so in a world of deeply alien moral agents. We cannot confidently
declare such a world unacceptable.

I. Introduction
Even among theists, divine command theory is commonly thought to be
deeply problematic. Some problems are mitigated when one moves from
sourcing morality in God’s commands, specifically, to sourcing it in his1
will, more generally. Perhaps it’s not specific, communicative commands
from God to groups of humans that fix the moral facts; it’s something
more universal about what God wants humans to do, or the behaviors
that he would choose for them, or loves. Even so, proponents of this more
general “theological voluntarism” are not large in number among theistic
philosophers.2
This is not too puzzling. After all, a seemingly devastating worry for
the view is well known. Does God will the kinds of human conduct he
does because such conduct is moral? Or instead, is the conduct God wills
moral because God wills it?3 If we assent to the first, we give up on a

I follow (possibly regrettable) convention in referring to God with masculine pronouns.
On divine command theory vs. theological voluntarism, see Murphy, God and Moral Law,
100. Murphy credits Quinn, “An Argument for Divine Command Ethics,” with the term.
3
This is of course the “Euthyphro problem.” See Plato, Euthyphro.
1
2
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theological voluntarism worthy of the name. If we assent to the second,
we seem to introduce morally abhorrent contingency into the question of
what we might owe to one other. What if God were to will cruelty?4
My project here is defensive and limited. I will not offer positive motivations for theological voluntarism,5 nor will I attempt to address all
major worries one might have about the view. But I will attempt to cast
doubt on this objection from contingency, which is pervasive in the literature and often thought to be damning. The theological voluntarist should
indeed think morality is contingent—that fundamental moral norms, values, and reasons could have been radically different than in fact they are.
But, I’ll argue, she needn’t think we ourselves could have been subject to
such a radically different system of morality. And the theological voluntarist’s commitment to the idea that God could have created a very different
moral order—for very different, alien moral agents—does not generate a
powerful objection to the view.
My strategy, broadly, is to consider logical constraints on moral facts—
hence constraints on the ways even a sovereign, omnipotent God might
will morality to be. God cannot make the number 3 a color. He cannot
make triangles have four sides. Neither, I claim, can he make what’s
morally good also be (in the same respect) morally bad.6 And neither, I’ll
argue, can he make a genuine system of morality for some agents that is
wholly opaque to all of those agents; robust, universal opacity is the sort
of property that morality could not logically have.
My approach is thus very different from other recent attempts to reconcile theological voluntarism with constraints on the moral systems or laws
an authoritative God might will. I do not claim that an authoritative moral
legislator is necessarily loving or that God’s commands are constrained
by non-voluntarist, “pre-existing” moral values. Hence, this is a partial
defense of “unrestricted” theological voluntarism.7 (I’ll use the shorter
term “theological voluntarism” in what follows.)
Cf. Adams, “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness,” 320.
Cf. Quinn, “The Primacy of God’s Will in Christian Ethics.”
6
There’s an uninteresting sense in which lots of actions are in some respects good and in
some respects bad. The claim, more carefully, is that God cannot make the very qualities that
make some action, person, or state of affairs morally good, also make it morally bad.
7
Some theological voluntarists (including, e.g., Quinn in later work (“An Argument for
Divine Command Ethics,” “The Primacy of God’s Will in Christian Ethics”), Alston (“Some
Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists”), and Adams (“A Modified Divine Command
Theory of Ethical Wrongness,” “Divine Command Metaethics Modified Again,” “Divine
Commands and the Social Nature of Obligation”)) avoid the contingency objection by
restricting the explanatory scope of their views (for a nice, concise discussion of historical
precedents, see Haldane, “Voluntarism and Realism in Medieval Ethics”). These authors
suggest that moral wrongness or moral obligation arises from the divine will, whereas other
moral properties and values have their source elsewhere (perhaps they are simply necessary or arise from God’s nature rather than his will). “Restricted” theological voluntarists
can deal handily with the contingency objection, since on their view God has good moral
reasons to will that wrongness or obligation be as they are. I will not have the space to evaluate restricted theological voluntarism here. (Murphy, in God and Moral Law, and “Restricted
4
5
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I will argue for two different logical constraints on morality—one constraining cruelty and one constraining morality itself. It’s important to
be clear on the status of these claims. In one sense I suppose these are
“analytic”; I will appeal to our sense of the concepts cruelty and morality
for their justification. And moreover I claim that these limit the logically
possible moral states of affairs. But, as controversies amongst logicians
demonstrate, to argue for something as a principle of logic is not to suggest that it is undeniable or must be uncontroversial once properly understood. If analyticity is taken to imply the impossibility of disagreement
among competent language users (as, arguably, it should not be if there
are to be any analytic truths8), I do not claim these as analytic truths. I simply do not defend theological voluntarists who reject them. My aim is to
show that there’s a compelling way of being a theological voluntarist—i.e.,
being a theological voluntarist who also accepts formal, logical constraints
on the ways morality might be—that allows one to satisfactorily answer
the contingency objection. Part of the burden of the paper will be to show,
especially in section 7, that these constraints are not only plausible but
consistent with motivations for theological voluntarism.
I’ll proceed as follows. In section 2, I’ll formalize the simple reductio
of theological voluntarism generated by the thought that, if theological
voluntarism is true, then cruelty could be morally good. In section 3, I’ll
critique and revise that reductio, inter alia introducing the broad strategy of
considering logical limits on God’s moral will, which I expand on in section 4. Sections 5 and 6 argue for an anti-opacity principle I call Suitability
and show how it blocks the revised contingency reductio. In section 7,
I close by considering the charge that the view I end up defending—theological voluntarism + Suitability—is not real theological voluntarism.
2. The Contingency Objection: First Pass
Robert Adams nicely characterized the contingency objection, which he
considered to be the “gravest objection” to divine command theory (a species of theological voluntarism):
Suppose God should command me to make it my chief end in life to inflict
suffering on other human beings, for no other reason than that He
commanded it . . . Will it seriously be claimed that in that case it would be
wrong for me not to practice cruelty for its own sake?9

Theological Voluntarism,” has criticized this strategy, claiming that restrictions both undercut positive motivations for theological voluntarism and generate new puzzles. See also
Morriston, “What If God Commanded Something Terrible?” for discussion). My project
is more radical; I want to defend unrestricted theological voluntarism: all moral facts—all
moral reasons, obligations, and values—have their immediate source in God’s will. I here
use “immediacy” following Murphy, “Restricted Theological Voluntarism,” 680.
8
See Williamson, The Philosophy of Philosophy, chapter 4.
9
Adams, “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness,” 320.
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Adams called a positive answer to this question “unacceptable,” and
I agree.10 We should not accept that cruelty for its own sake could possibly
be morally good. I want to begin by formalizing this common reasoning:
		 1. If theological voluntarism is true, then God could have willed that agents
engage in cruelty for its own sake.
		 2. If theological voluntarism is true, then, if God could have willed that agents
engage in cruelty for its own sake, cruelty for its own sake could have been
morally good (or right).
		 3. (By 1, 2) If theological voluntarism is true, then cruelty for its own sake could
have been morally good (or right).
		 4. Cruelty for its own sake could not have been morally good (or right).
Conclusion: theological voluntarism is false.

The nonderived premises are just 1, 2, and 4. Premise 1 seems to follow
from the very theological conception of God that helps motivate theological voluntarism—a conception on which God is perfectly free, sovereign,
and omnipotent. Premise 2 seems definitive of theological voluntarism.
And premise 4 is a good candidate for being a bedrock moral intuition.
This seems, at first, a damning reductio.
3. The Revised Contingency Objection
Yet theological voluntarists can (and should) deny premise 1. Adams himself is clear that this premise—“that it is logically possible for God to command cruelty for its own sake”—is an assumption, though he also claims
it seems difficult for voluntarists in particular to deny it and that, e.g.,
William of Ockham would have accepted it.11 I claim that even radical,
Ockham-esque theological voluntarists should reject premise 1.
This is because “cruelty” is a moral concept, a thick term necessarily
implying significant (pro tanto) moral badness.12 A cruel trick is one that,
ceteris paribus, ought not to be played; cruel treatment of any person is,
ceteris paribus, impermissible. But when we call an action cruel we actually do something a bit stronger; we say that the cruelty of the action is
(part of) what makes it bad. A cruel trick’s cruelty is always a (significant!)
moral reason not to play it, just as a kind gesture’s kindness always counts
in favor of its moral goodness. I claim an action’s cruelty is, necessarily, a
serious reason counting against the morality of its performance.
Now one might argue that there are some cruel actions that nonetheless
ought to be done, such as torturing an innocent person in order to appease
a demon threatening to destroy the whole world. The demon might even
command specifically cruel treatment; nothing else would cause him to
refrain from world destruction. In such recherché cases, it may be that
one has an instrumental moral reason to be cruel (for a more realistic case,

Adams, “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness,” 321.
Adams, “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness,” 320.
12
For the introduction of “thick concepts,” see Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.
10
11
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one might have reason to tell a cruel joke to cheer up a severely depressed
friend with a twisted sense of humor).
But, regardless of whether cruelty is ever actually justified, supposing
that it is in such cases is compatible with my claim. For in these cases, the
putative final moral reasons for performing the cruel actions are certainly
not that these would be cruel.13 Rather, the final moral reason for appeasing the demon is that this would benefit others or preserve life. It’s the
beneficence of the action that counts in favor of it. Similarly, the moral reason for telling the cruel joke is one’s friend’s need; it’s the loving, caring,
kind, or helpful nature of the action, rather than its cruelty, that makes it
even plausible as permissible.
The question that’s important for my argument is whether an action’s
being cruel always, necessarily, counts against it morally, to some extent
or in some way. I take it the fairly clear answer is yes.
But if this is right, then trying to suppose that an action were cruel but
that it was nonetheless good and right to perform the action “for its own
sake” (i.e., because it was cruel) involves a contradiction. It is good and
right to perform actions for the reasons that make them right. Were God
to will that humans engage in cruelty for its own sake, cruelty—necessarily a moral bad-making feature of actions—would have to function as a
moral good-making feature of actions. And even Ockham, that paradigm
of radical theological voluntarism, held that God cannot will a contradiction into existence.14
Theists already accept many similar logical limitations on God. Again,
God cannot will that 3 be a color—or that a square be also a circle, or
that there be a rock he cannot pick up. Descartes aside, these constraints
on God’s will are typically taken to be no mark against his sovereignty
or omnipotence. I’m suggesting that in much the same way, God is constrained by logic when it comes to morality. God cannot make it the case
that an action’s being cruel adds to its moral value, any more than he
could make it the case that a shape’s having three sides makes it a square.
If this is granted, the theological voluntarist’s argument against premise 1 is straightforward:
		 5. If God willed that agents engage in cruelty for its own sake, then a potential
action’s cruelty would be a moral reason to perform it. (theological voluntarism)
		 6. It is impossible that a potential action’s cruelty be a moral reason to perform
it. (logic of cruelty)
		 Conclusion: It is impossible that God will agents to engage in cruelty for its
own sake.
See Korsgaard, “Two Distinctions in Goodness.”
See Adams, “Ockham on Will, Nature, and Morality,” for discussion and argument
against the most radical understandings of Ockham’s voluntarism. Indeed, Ockham appears
to have made similar claims about adultery to those I have made about cruelty. Namely, that
God could command the act but only under a different name or description, since “adultery”
connotes wrongness. Thanks to an anonymous referee for bringing the adultery case to my
attention. See also Osborne, “Ockham as a Divine Command Theorist,” 9.
13
14
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By leaning on a relatively simple claim about the logic of the concept of
cruelty, the theological voluntarist can dispel this first version of the contingency objection.
Of course, the rejoinder is waiting in the wings. God needn’t will cruelty under that description. Perhaps he could will that agents engage in
actions satisfying the various nonmoral descriptions that—for us, given
what God has willed in our world—make them count as cruel.15,16 In a
different world, he could have willed actions that are in fact cruel in our
world. Sure, he could not have made the moral badness of an action be
its moral goodness. But the theological voluntarist does seem bound to
think he could possibly have imbued, e.g., actions that cause intense pain
sensations in sentient beings without any other significant effects or complicating factors, with positive moral significance.
We must be careful here. For while some concepts like cruelty are clearly
moral and others like intense sensations are clearly nonmoral, there are lots
of concepts and terms in between. Take suffering. There is a natural understanding of suffering such that it necessarily has moral significance. In the
current context, we should not use suffering in that sense to describe the
kind of actions God might have willed.17 By the theological voluntarist’s
lights, God could not have willed actions that are necessarily morally bad
into moral goodness. But he could have willed actions that satisfy various
purely nonmoral descriptions into moral goodness.18 And that is a strange
and troubling enough thought to generate a revised version of the contingency objection to theological voluntarism:
		 1* God could have willed that agents engage in what is, in our world, cruelty
for its own sake.
		 2* If theological voluntarism is true, then, if God could have willed that agents
engage in what is, in our world, cruelty for its own sake, then what is in our
world cruelty for its own sake could have been morally good (or right).
		 3* (By 1, 2) If theological voluntarism is true, then what is, in our world, cruelty
for its own sake could have been morally good (or right).
15
Cf. MacIntyre, “Which God Ought We to Obey and Why?” 360; Murphy, God and Moral
Law, 123.
16
It’s famously difficult to formulate purely descriptive, nonmoral rules separating what
we take to be cruel actions from what we take to be non-cruel actions. Although I myself
am pessimistic about general nonmoral rules sufficient to identify cruel actions, I think this
objection is dialectically unhelpful to me. God’s will for agents might look very particularist
and piecemeal. But this would not separate the world in which God wills what is, in our
world, cruelty, from our actual world, in which he anti-wills such behavior and instead wills
what is in our world noble or loving (also a particularist, piecemeal affair).
17
Thanks to Michael Rea for helpful discussion on this point.
18
Cf. Foot, “Moral beliefs,” for classic discussion of the flexibility of “goodness.” Foot’s
interlocutor thinks that “morally good” is an extremely flexible, purely evaluative concept
that could in theory be predicated of all kinds of trivial actions—a position superficially similar to mine. Foot argues convincingly that this cannot be so, absent what she calls a “special
background.” I think the theological voluntarist should think of God’s counterfactual willing
as precisely the kind of special background Foot allows for. Thanks to José Eduardo Porcher
for pointing me to this reference.
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		 4* What is, in our world, cruelty for its own sake could not have been morally
good. (Moral Impossibility)
		 Conclusion: theological voluntarism is false.

Moral Impossibility, or 4*, is less intuitive than 4 and, ultimately, I will
argue the theological voluntarist should reject it. However, I do not pretend that Moral Impossibility is implausible or should be given up
readily. In order to reject Moral Impossibility convincingly, the theological voluntarist should identify a true premise in the vicinity of Moral
Impossibility that is consistent with theological voluntarism. I propose:
Human Moral Impossibility: What is, in our world, cruelty for its own
sake could not have been morally good, for human moral agents.

That is, there are no humans or human counterparts, in any possible
world, for whom the sorts of actions that in our world count as cruelty are
morally good. I affirm Human Moral Impossibility. But notice that it is
insufficient for the revised contingency argument to go through. Human
Moral Impossibility is fully consistent with theological voluntarism and:
Alien Moral Possibility: What is, in our world, cruelty for its own sake
could have been morally good, for some alien agents.

In the rest of the paper, I’ll argue that a logical constraint on morality I’ll
call Suitability secures Human Moral Impossibility, in a way that is
consistent with Alien Moral Possibility as well as theological voluntarism and its motivations.
4. Logical Limits on Morality
First, however, it will be helpful to stress again just what sort of principle
Suitability is supposed to be. In the previous section, I argued that some
of our moral concepts, like the concept of cruelty, have a logic. There are
logical facts about how these concepts necessarily relate to some other
concepts (e.g., good, bad, right-making, blameworthy, etc.). Here, I want to
suggest that the concept of morality itself also has a logic. There are facts
about what morality or moral facts—i.e., moral values, norms, and/or reasons—must be like in any moral world.
Let’s start with an easy one:
No Cheese: Morality cannot consist in blocks of cheese.

No Cheese is, I hope, uncontroversial. Why is that? While there is significant controversy over what it takes for something to be a moral fact—
as opposed to a legal fact, or a biological fact, or an aesthetic fact—there
are some loose boundaries of the concept that rule out cheesy possibilities
definitively. Just as God cannot will 3 to be a color, he cannot will morality
to be cheese. This is, of course, a very minimal constraint on God’s moral
will, which (I hope) no one will dispute.
On the other end of the spectrum, though, it seems to me theological
voluntarists should be leery of very substantive principles, if those are
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supposed to constrain what any logically possible system of morality
might involve. For example, someone might claim that morality necessarily and as a matter of logic has to do with promoting flourishing over
suffering, or that it has to do with respect for justice, etc. If that were right,
then God would seem to be limited by such putative logical truth about
morality as well. But, given the high view of God’s omnipotence and sovereignty that often leads one to theological voluntarism in the first place,
it seems safer to suppose that there are no such substantive constraints on
the logic of morality, or at least none of which we can be confident. The
unrestricted theological voluntarist, to enjoy the positive motivations for
her view,19 should maintain God’s perfect freedom and control over all
of morality. This is consistent with some logical constraints, such as No
Cheese, but substantive constraints on the sorts of acts/agents/states of
affairs that can be morally good are a different matter and would seem to
compromise the position.
What about principles “in the middle,” so to speak? Are there purely
formal, voluntaristically acceptable principles constraining the logic of
morality (and hence constraining God’s moral will) that nonetheless have
more bite, or tell us more about what any moral system must be like, than
No Cheese?
We might start with:
Normativity: Moral facts can matter to what moral agents should do.

Any world with moral reasons, values, or norms is a world where it is possible that agents should do something because of those reasons, values,
or norms. Even God could not make a genuinely moral world of which
this was not true. Of course it’s possible to be skeptical about whether one
really should do what one morally should do. But if one is skeptical about
whether moral facts could matter at all to what one really should do, then
it seems that one is skeptical of genuine morality (as distinct from sociological facts about what people would say is/isn’t moral).
So it seems morality, whatever else it might be like, has the ability to
matter to what moral agents should do. But talk of what agents “should”
do is a bit ambiguous, and I believe we can say something a bit stronger
than Normativity. For there is a strained sense of “should” that’s purely
evaluative rather than action-guiding. I might, e.g., say wistfully that
I “should” have gone on vacation back in January 2020, before the covid19 pandemic hit the US (this would have been very good for me, let’s
suppose), even though I couldn’t possibly have known this at the time
or acted rationally in taking my vacation so early. But it seems to me the
more natural sense of “should” is action-guiding; it’s indexed to the sorts
of considerations agents do or could appreciate and be motivated by. And,
in the following section, I intend to defend a very weak version of the
requirement that any properly moral system must not only be normative
19

Cf. Murphy, “Restricted Theological Voluntarism.”
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in some, possibly purely evaluative sense; it must be, at least in principle,
the sort of system that some moral agents can grasp and respond to:
Suitability: Moral facts are suited to the appreciation of the kinds of moral
agents to whom they apply.

In section six I’ll explain why I think this relatively thin, formal constraint
on God’s moral will is nonetheless strong enough to rule out the most
troubling possibilities pressed by the contingency objection to theological
voluntarism; it’s strong enough to secure Human Moral Impossibility.
But first, why accept Suitability as a logical constraint on morality?
5. Suitability
My argument for Suitability will take the form of (1) considering arguments for and against a much stronger position, existence internalism; (2)
showing how Suitability captures some of the motivations for existence
internalism without incurring its primary cost; and (3) responding to an
objection from the variation of moral principles that human moral agents
in different societies have seemed (un)able to appreciate.
5.1. Existence Internalism
Consider:
Moral Existence Internalism: Moral reasons must be capable of motivating the agents to whom they apply.

Moral Existence Internalism is distinct from moral judgment internalism, the latter being a thesis about what making a moral/normative
judgment entails.20 Moral Existence Internalism is also distinct from
a more general reasons internalism, a thesis about the possible motivational power of all normative practical reasons. And yet a good deal of
the plausibility of moral existence internalism derives from that more
general thesis.
In Williams’s classic paper arguing for general reasons internalism,
he appeals to the possessibility and explanatory power of reasons. On
the first: “If something can be a reason for acting, then it could be someone’s reason for acting on a particular occasion [. . .].”21 Reasons apply to
agents. They are, necessarily, the sorts of things that may be possessed
and used. The quote continues, emphasizing their explanatory power:
“[. . .] and it would then figure in an explanation of that action.”22 Once
we are considering a person’s reason for acting, we are considering the
sort of thing that can explain or justify a performance, as having rationally prompted it. Korsgaard summarizes general reasons internalism succinctly: “[I]t seems to be a requirement on practical reasons, that they be
Cf. Darwall, Impartial Reason.
Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” 106.
22
Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” 106.
20
21
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capable of motivating us.”23 If this general thesis is true, then—so long as
moral reasons are a species of practical reasons—so is Moral Existence
Internalism.
Now one might also try to motivate Moral Existence Internalism on
specifically moral grounds, or at least on grounds less tied up with the philosophy of reasons and rationality. Consider Kant’s “ought implies can.”
It is at least arguable that a moral agent is excused from typical moral
requirements, in some situation, if she is actually unable to comply with
those. This too, in a different way, suggests that the sort of considerations
that can motivate an agent matter to what is actually morally demanded
from her; they seem to matter at least to the sorts of motivations she may
be morally required to act from.
On the other hand, Moral Existence Internalism and its more general cousin, reasons internalism, face significant challenges. Most notably, existence internalists seem unable to secure sufficient objectivity for
moral/normative reasons. Consider Parfit’s Future Tuesday Indifference
case.24 Parfit imagines a “certain hedonist” who “never cares about possible pains or pleasures on a future Tuesday. Thus he would choose a painful
operation on the following Tuesday rather than a much less painful operation on the following Wednesday.”25 Parfit’s claim is that “This man’s pattern of concern is irrational. Why does he prefer agony on Tuesday to mild
pain on any other day? Simply because the agony will be on a Tuesday.
This is no reason.”26 To put the point only slightly more strongly, we might
say this man has a reason not to choose the more painful operation next
Tuesday, regardless of whether he himself can see it or be brought to care
about it.
The moral version of this problem is perhaps even clearer. ShaferLandau gives a nice statement of it:
Consider a person so misanthropic, so heedless of others’ regard, so bent on
cruelty, that nothing in his present set of motives would prevent him from
committing the worst kind of horrors. He cannot, in the relevant sense, be
moved to forbear from such behaviour. But why should this unfortunate fact
force us to revise our standards for appropriate conduct? Nothing we say to
him will convince him to modify his behaviour. But is this intransigence a
basis for holding him to different standards, or isn’t it rather a justification
for convicting him of a kind of blindness? It is natural to say that people
have reason to refrain from behaviour that is fiendish, callous, brutal, arrogant, or craven. We don’t withdraw such evaluations just because their targets fail (or would, after deliberation, fail) to find them compelling.27

In this paper I want to remain neutral on Moral Existence Internalism
and reasons internalism generally. Instead of adjudicating those disputes,
Korsgaard, “Skepticism About Practical Reason,” 11.
Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 123–124.
25
Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 124.
26
Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 124.
27
Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism, 187.
23
24
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my aim is to point out one very weak thing that I think internalists get
right, which does not threaten the objectivity of reasons or morality.
5.2. Suitability vs. Moral Existence Internalism
Namely, Suitability: moral facts have to be suited to the appreciation
of the kinds of agents to whom they apply. Suitability simply rules out
the possibility that morality is hopelessly opaque to moral agents, as a
group.28 If Suitability is true, then it is impossible, e.g., that for humans
in our world right now, there is a moral reason for humans to promote the
instantiation of the color blue, or that it is strictly morally impermissible
to type on a keyboard.
Two terms deserve attention in my definition, especially as these
depart from the terminology of Moral Existence Internalism. First,
Suitability refers to “appreciation” rather than motivation. This reflects
an attempt at greater ecumenicism about how exactly moral considerations should be able to move us or be grasped by us. In humans, appreciating a moral fact typically involves a cognitive grasp of some reason for
acting, an appropriate affective response, and concomitant motivational
dispositions.29 Appreciating the moral wrong of racism typically involves,
e.g., belief in the worth and dignity of all people, dispositions to anger
and sadness upon encountering or considering racism, and motivation
to behave in ways that are non- or anti- racist. But there is controversy
over which of these elements is really central or necessary for a good
grasp of a moral fact. We might think, especially after reading the previous subsection, that motivation is crucial. Yet motivation alone can be a
blind, seemingly arational affair (thus, some might think, insufficient for
“appreciation”), and, relatedly, motivation is often blocked by arational
contingencies such as depression and exhaustion (thus, some might think,
unnecessary for “appreciation”). Suitability requires that—whatever an
appropriate grasp of morality looks like—at least some moral agents of a
kind could be capable of that.
The second term needing attention is “kinds.” This marks the most
interesting difference between Suitability and Moral Existence
Internalism. Suitability does not say that moral facts must be suited
to the appreciation of every individual moral agent; rather Suitability
claims morality is necessarily connected to the appreciative capacities
of at least some (typical or, alternatively, excellent) agents of a group or
kind. Suitability leaves open the possibility of moral facts that would
apply to those who really cannot appreciate what they ought to do but
Some theologians have held that (part of) morality is opaque outside of religion. I take
it Aquinas thought this. This is not my own view, but it is compatible with Suitability.
Perhaps humans have the capacity to appreciate morality but only because they have the
capacity for religion. Thanks to Brian Leftow for bringing this to my attention.
29
I have argued for a view of what a good grasp of moral facts involves, in a different
dialectical context, in Callahan, “Moral Testimony.”
28
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who nonetheless belong to a kind of social, rational agents for whom such
appreciation is possible. (A similar sort of principle may be plausible in
the aesthetic domain: perhaps a genuinely beautiful piece of art needn’t
be such that everyone can appreciate it as such, but it must be suited to the
appreciation of at least some artistically-minded humans.)
Suitability is the claim that, whatever else morality may be, it has to
be the kind of thing that moral agents—at least some of them, at least in
some deep and partially idealized sense—could deeply make sense of and
rationally respond to. Robust, universal opacity is not the kind of property
a system of morality could have.
Suitability seems to me intrinsically plausible. It also pretty clearly
enjoys a fortiori motivation from arguments favoring Moral Existence
Internalism. It can capture a sense of Korsgaard’s claim, that practical
(or, rather, moral) reasons have to be capable of motivating us. They must
be capable of moving agents like us, agents of our kind, who share our
broad appreciative capacities. Moreover, Suitability affirms that any
moral “ought” implies some form of motivational/appreciative can: anything I ought to do is such that I at least have the right kind of capacities to
appreciate its goodness/rightness.
So Suitability captures some of the motivations supporting Moral
Existence Internalism. Yet unlike classic versions of internalism,
Suitability does not even seem to threaten objectivity. Parfit’s exhibitor
of future Tuesday indifference and Shafer-Landau’s misanthrope both
clearly belong to the same rational, social kind with people who do appreciate reasons to avoid agony on future Tuesdays and to treat others well,
so Suitability is compatible with thinking they too have such reasons.
My interest in Suitability, as I’ll argue in the next section, is that if
Suitability is true, and true as a logical fact about morality, constraining
logically morally possible states of affairs, this supports Human Moral
Impossibility. For if Suitability is true, then even God couldn’t will some
morality into existence that was wholly opaque to all the moral agents to
whom it applied, and any moral system affirming the goodness/rightness
of what we currently call cruelty would be opaque to humans or their
counterparts.
But before completing my defense of that argument, I want to consider an important objection to Suitability. Namely, whole swaths of
people have seemed to themselves to appreciate the moral rectitude of
slaveholding, cannibalism, and torture of innocents. Concomitantly, they
have failed collectively to appreciate moral reasons for respecting human
dignity and freedom. If we understood “kinds” narrowly, as indexed to
societies or cultures, then Suitability might seem to imply that they had
no such moral reasons. Let me be clear: I disagree. All people have always
had moral reasons not to support the institution of slavery. This is because
groups or kinds of moral agents should be understood widely, defined by
their broad capacities for moral appreciation (e.g., humans, not 18th century
Southern gentry).
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Consider a society in which cannibalism—specifically the consumption of those of an out-group as a show of strength, courage, and honor—
deeply makes sense to people as morally good. I want to say it makes
sense to think of even these people as having the same kind of appreciative
capacities we do—“humans” is the right category here. For even people
in this cannibalistic society could share some of our basic moral values
and sensibilities. After all, honor—or integrity, or justice, or moral rectitude, or what have you—is a moral value. As is love for members of an
in-group—one’s children, parents, or friends. Moreover, though this cannibalistic society is profoundly morally confused, there is a sense in which
they could know better. They have the right kind of moral capacities, they
have enough of a hold on the kind of things that matter morally—however tenuous that hold may seem—that moral improvement is not hopeless for them, though it might indeed involve a great deal of time, effort,
and re-enculturation in better moral society (indeed, I suspect that not
much better could be said of contemporary societies; we might substitute
“factory farming” for cannibalism). Even humans in cannibalistic societies
belong to a social, rational kind that can appreciate moral facts.30
6. Suitability and the Revised Contingency Objection
Let us return to the revised contingency objection to theological voluntarism. I want us to think carefully about the world envisioned by 3*—i.e.,
the merely possible world in which God wills what is in fact cruel (in our
world) and where, according to the theological voluntarist, such behavior
is morally good/right. The objector to theological voluntarism espouses
Moral Impossibility and claims this world is impossible. But I want to
suggest instead that this world is alien, in the sense that moral agents must
be aliens rather than humans or human counterparts in such a world.
I suspect the usual way of trying to think about the world in which
God’s commands are radically different is something like this: we try to
imagine God’s will for humanity changing, at some unspecified point in
the future. Or we try to imagine a hypothetical human history in which
our familiar societies and psychological tendencies had developed underneath a strangely-willing God. In other words, we try to imagine rather
nearby possible worlds in which God’s will might be different—and yet
many other facts about moral agents’ histories, their natures, and, crucially, their rational and moral capacities might remain the same.
It’s this procedure, I suspect, that generates the strong intuition in
favor of Moral Impossibility. There are no nearby possible worlds in
which what is in our world cruel is instead morally good or right. Given
Suitability, in order to consider a world in which some behavior is morally right or rational, one has to consider a world in which that behavior
is suited to the appreciation of the agents to whom it applies. That is, one
must imagine a world in which the best of agents could, while making
30

Thanks to Robert Adams for helpful discussion on the morality of other human societies.
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no moral mistakes, appreciate and be motivated by a reason to, e.g., cut
off agents’ limbs at birth for the sake of their greater approximation of an
oval shape.31
This is no small imaginative task. What would it be like to deeply and
correctly appreciate the morality of such behavior? What would agents be
like who were capable of such appreciation?
This part of my argument closely parallels an argument given in Street,
where she defends attitude-dependent conceptions of normative reasons. Street takes herself to be tackling “a modern, secular version of the
Euthyphro debate.”32 Paraphrasing—does one have reasons to prefer the
scratching of one’s finger to the destruction of the world because of some
broader, deeper fact about our attitudes and desires? Or do we (typically)
desire the former more than the latter because we have reason to do so?
Street takes the first, attitude-dependent horn of the dilemma (the analogue of theological voluntarism), and she agrees with critics of such positions that this commits her to seemingly outlandish possibilities. Ideally
coherent but highly eccentric individuals—of which Parfit’s man with
future Tuesday indifference is one example—might really have reason,
e.g., to prefer the destruction of the world.
I am not espousing Street’s attitude dependence. What’s interesting for
my purposes is the way Street attempts to make the outlandish plausible
by, first, considering in detail what these ideally coherent eccentrics would
have to be like. They are not, she argues, your kooky Uncle Fred or even
the neo-Nazis next door. Those individuals are nowhere near ideal coherence. Real-life kooky uncles and neo-Nazis are making ridiculous, tragic,
and/or infuriating mistakes about what they really value and what this
entails for how they should live. With some more careful sketches of ideally coherent eccentrics in hand, Street proceeds to claim that initially outlandish verdicts look at least more plausible than they might at first seem.

It may be objected that these agents needn’t have the same, seemingly a-religious (or
natural, or general-revelatory) access to moral facts that we seem to have. Perhaps these
agents might appreciate the morality of cutting off limbs by (i) believing (correctly) that God
wills them to do it, and (ii) desiring to be in harmony with God. Are agents who could “make
sense of” cutting off limbs in that way necessarily alien? After all, this is how some (though
not I) understand Abraham’s predicament: Abraham had, and knew he had, a moral reason
to kill Isaac stemming from God’s command.
The world we are considering, however, is not one in which God overrides standing
moral prohibitions on what is, in our world, cruelty. It is rather a world in which there are no
prohibitions on such behavior. God hasn’t willed them. So—assuming Suitability extends
to some negations of moral facts—we must imagine that the best of agents in this world are
capable of seeing the matter such that they would not even be conflicted about whether to cut
off limbs; they would not see it as a case of genuine competing considerations, or a case of
revealed morality overriding “natural” morality. Those agents could not be humans.
See also note 28 above; in general, I take no stand on the necessary epistemology of
morality, whether this must be generally or specially revealed. Thanks to Mark Murphy for
raising this issue.
32
Street, “In Defense of Future Tuesday Indifference,” 274.
31
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Similarly, an important aspect of my strategy is to suggest that it takes
some care to think through what a world would be like if God had willed
morality to be very different than in fact it is. Given Suitability, agents in
that world would, as a kind, be capable of genuinely appreciating the moral
goodness/rightness of what is, in our world, cruel.
These agents, I claim, could not be humans (Human Moral
Impossibility). They could not be our mothers or cousins or even our distant ancestors or descendants. For though our real cousins and ancestors
may have highly, troublingly dubious moral views, these human individuals are making mistakes. They merely seem to themselves to appreciate, e.g., the goodness of cannibalism. But their confusion is, collectively,
remediable. Human beings on the whole are capable of seeing the moral
badness of cruelty. And any kind of moral agents whose typical or exemplary members were not capable of this but instead were capable of the
total reverse would be an alien kind.
Of course, this involves some appeal to intuition. I will not here offer
and defend any particular theory of human nature, psychology, or moral
capacities that entails exclusion of the possibility that best (or typical)
humans would be able to discern and respond to moral reasons to cut off
the limbs of infants for the sake of ovalness. But my intuition in this case is
a very strong one. And recall that the contingency objection to theological
voluntarism rests on an intuition too: Moral Impossibility.
Formally, we can separate this reasoning into a few premises, generating an argument for Human Moral Impossibility that leaves Alien
Moral Possibility intact:
		 7. Morally good or right actions are suited to the appreciation of the kinds of
moral agents to whom they apply (Suitability)
		 8. Therefore, in the possible world envisioned by 3*, the moral goodness of
what is, in our world, cruelty is suited to the appreciation of moral agents in
that world.
		 9. Any world in which what is, in our world, cruelty for its own sake is suited
to the appreciation of moral agents, is an alien (non-human) world.
		 10. (from 8, 9) The possible world envisioned by 3* is an alien (non-human)
world.
		 Conclusion: Human Moral Impossibility.

Any world in which God wills what is in our world cruelty, is an alien
world, with alien moral agents. The theological voluntarist can espouse
Human Moral Impossibility. But, so long as she thinks God really could
have willed morality to be radically different, she must still espouse Alien
Moral Possibility. What should we say about the possibility of such
an alien morality? Is the theological voluntarist’s commitment to Alien
Moral Possibility still strong enough to ground a contingency reductio
of her view?
It seems not. Regardless of what we might find intuitive to say about
the real moral obligations of alien agents (ought they really to cut off infant
limbs? Would this be morally good in them in the same way that, e.g.,
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altruistic acts of generosity are good in humans?), I think the second-order
question of how confident we should be in theorizing about morality for
such agents is pretty clear (here again, I echo Street). We should be very
humble about our abilities to theorize morality for alien beings. After all,
all our fodder for moral theorizing comes from what Crisp calls “lived
morality”—i.e., lived human morality.33 We should be much less confident
about moral theorizing on behalf of alien creatures. If that’s right, then we
should not confidently reject Alien Moral Possibility.
Recall that the dialectic is a defensive one. The revised contingency
objection purports to demonstrate that theological voluntarism must be
false. But the revised contingency objection relies on a premise—Moral
Impossibility—which is too dubious to bear its argumentative burden.
It’s dubious, first, because once we separate Human Moral
Impossibility from Moral Impossibility, it is not clear that we have strong
intuitions supporting the latter, more general impossibility claim rather
than the former, more specific one. And as I’ve been at pains to argue,
the theological voluntarist can secure Human Moral Impossibility, by
appeal to Suitability. Second, Alien Moral Possibility, considered in
its own right, seems very difficult to rule out. The theological voluntarist with a high view of God’s sovereignty over morality should certainly
accept Alien Moral Possibility. But all of us—even those without prior
commitments or sympathies toward theological voluntarism—should
admit that our abilities to reason about Alien Moral Possibility are limited by our terrestrial intuitions and imaginations.
In sum, theological voluntarism + Suitability can secure Human
Moral Impossibility, and while some may still be uncomfortable with
the view’s entailing Alien Moral Possibility, this is far from the sort
of damning reductio of the view that the contingency objection is often
claimed to be.
7. Real Theological Voluntarism?
I’ve presented myself as defending full-strength, unrestricted theological
voluntarism. Yet I’ve done so by arguing for a significant constraint on
God’s moral will. Actually, I’ve argued, God couldn’t have willed morality
to be radically different—unless moral agents were also radically different. One worry for my view is that it doesn’t really vindicate the high view
of God’s sovereignty and omnipotence that (partly) motivates theological voluntarism in the first place. I will consider two different versions of
this worry.
First version: one might think real, full-blooded omnipotence entails
a lot of “could haves.” God could have made pigs fly. Or made chocolate taste like asparagus. Or made tomatoes talk. One who held this view
would not be satisfied with proposals like, “Well, it’s true that God could
have made pigs fly. But not our pigs—in order to make pigs fly many other
33

Crisp, “Does Modern Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”
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important things in the universe would have to be differently arranged,
we’d have to be talking about alien pigs, and that world would be very distant in modal space.” (Similar proposals would be unsatisfying for chocolate and tomatoes.) Why, then, should we be satisfied with the thought
that God could have made morality different, but only if he created a very
different sort of moral agents than us, in a distant possible world?34
Second version: this so-called theological voluntarism is actually more
similar to natural law theory, Murphy’s “moral concurrentism,”35 or simply a theistic Aristotelian virtue ethics. For it seems that on my view, too,
the kind of beings we are determines morality. God’s will in creating the
natural order may have moral effects, but he lacks the power to immediately determine the moral order.
I have a three-part response that applies jointly to these versions of the
worry. First, I have not said there is exactly one way morality could be
for any humans or human counterparts. Indeed, it seems plausible to me
that had God willed differently, e.g., justice and the alleviation of suffering
might have had different relative weights in the moral system, for us. It is
only when we imagine the scenario in which morality is radically different—in which what is in our world morally bad (inequality) or morally
irrelevant (the color blue, ovalness) is elevated to moral importance—that,
so say I, we must be imagining a world of alien moral agents. This preserves the idea that God has libertarian freedom in willing human morality
even holding fixed the creation of humans with our basic moral capacities.
Analogously—regardless of whether God could make (our) pigs fly, he
could certainly have made them all reddish, or a little shorter, etc.
Second, even if we set this aside and assume that basic human capacities for moral appreciation admit of only one way human morality could
be, there is still a question of priority. That is, does God will morality as
he does because of the human moral capacities he has created? Or does he
create human moral capacities to fit the morality he has willed? Or is the
choice a single, unified one? As long as we do not assent to the first question—as long as we do not see God’s moral will as constrained by a prior
choice or commitment to human moral capacities—the freedom of God’s
moral will seems intact. And nothing about my picture puts pressure on
us to see God’s choice of capacities as coming “first” in this way.
Finally, there is a subtle but important difference between views on
which a thing’s nature constrains morality and my view, on which agents’
capacities for moral appreciation constrain morality. On many other
views, a thing’s nature slots into a necessary teleological framework of
hypothetical moral imperatives. If a thing has this nature, its good and aim
and, therefore, the moral norms/values/reasons that apply to it must be
(roughly) like this.

34
35

Thanks to Dean Zimmerman for suggesting this version of the objection.
Murphy, God and Moral Law.
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I reject this strictly necessary moral framework and principle as too
substantive a constraint on God’s moral will (although of course I can’t
critique such views at any length here). The necessary conditionals my
view entails are more formal, less substantive. They take the form: if moral
agents have these moral capacities, then morality has to be (roughly) like
this. I say that these are formal because, as I’ve argued, they fall out of the
logic of morality, its being not-hopelessly-opaque as a matter of logical
necessity. They are not, importantly, substantive moral claims about the
good or aim of creatures with various natures, nor about the necessary
moral relevance of creaturely aims.
8. Conclusion
My arguments, if successful, are a partial defense of theological voluntarism. Of course, there are other putatively devastating objections to the
view besides the contingency objection. Most notably: how is the theological voluntarist supposed to view God’s goodness? That is a question for
another paper. The primary contention of the present paper is that even
the theological voluntarist should accept some logical constraints on the
ways God could have willed morality to be, and plausible candidates for
those constraints seem sufficient to allay the contingency objection.36
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